21 October 1965

BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE DCI

SOUTH VIETNAM

(MAP-SOUTH VIETNAM MILITARY BOUNDARIES)

- The military picture in South Vietnam now offers more encouragement than at any time in the past few years. It is by no means certain, however, that the tide has turned in favor of the Saigon government.
 - A. Essentially, the rapid build-up of US ground forces this summer, accompanied by accelerated air activity against the Communists, has stabilized the military situation. The confidence of South Vietnam's armed forces has also been boosted.
 - B. The Viet Cong, who last spring appeared likely to achieve significant psychological and territorial inroads in their summer monsoon drive, in fact scored only limited gains in the western highlands area. In most of their major operations they suffered heavy casualties; there are also indications of a Viet Cong morale problem.

- C. By late summer the initiative largely shifted to South Vietnamese US hands, as US troops began to move out of their base perimeter areas and to conduct search-and-destroy operations against Viet Cong main force units in their strongholds. A higher rate of harassment against Communist forces is now being sustained, and prospects are that this pressure will increase as the US and allied build-up continues and experience is gained.
- II. Although it is still too early to gauge the Viet Cong response to this new situation, evidence suggests that they are in a period of reassessment, and that they have not so far altered their fundamental strategy.
 - A. Since late July, there has been a general tendency by the Viet Cong to try to avoid large-scale engagements, in which they are particularly vulnerable to air retaliation.
 - 1. The Communists have offered heavy resistance, however, when they have been forced to engage. They have also sustained a relatively high rate of large-scale attacks--averaging four or five a month--against targets of their own choosing.

- 2. Moreover, despite some over-all drop in the number of Communist armed attacks since mid-summer, the Viet Cong have maintained a generally high level of guerrilla-type harassment and sabotage; in the week ending October 16, there were 758 incidents, the highest total since the first week of October last year.
- B. Our best guess is that at present, the Communists are currently making strenuous efforts to replace this summer's losses and continue to expand their own regular army.
 - 1. There is some evidence that they are levying unusual troop demands on irregular guerrilla units to fill out existing Main Force units or build new ones, and that they are attempting to collect and stockpile food and other supplies for a coming winter military campaign.
 - 2. COMUSMACV has recently increased his Order of Battle holdings on Viet Cong regulars by some 5,500, to a total of 76,100, largely through the confirmation of two additional regiments of North Vietnam's 325th Division, plus four new Viet Cong battalions.

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- 3. In addition, Viet Cong irregular strength, previously estimated at about 90,000, is now believed to be between 100,000 and 120,000
- a current reorganization and possible expansion, including an unusual concentration of large units in coastal Binh Dinh Provincesite of a large and only partially successful US-Vietnamese sweep earlier this month designed to trap forces which have been harassing the main coastal highway.
 - 1. The reason for this Viet Cong move into
 Binh Dinh, where US forces are now present in strength, is unknown. It may be
 designed to secure supply routes, contain
 US troops from expanding outward, or apply pressure on the northern coastal areas
 which will soon experience monsoons.
- IV. South Vietnam's forces have profited by the US

 build-up to continue their own expansion: the

 regulars now number 285,000, and paramilitary

 forces have increased to a total of 326,000, for

 a combined armed strength of more than 610,000.
 - A. US strength, meanwhile, currently stands at approximately 144,000. Third-country troop

strength--primarily Australian and South Korean-is roughly 9,500, with another 9,000 Koreans due shortly.

- V. On the political scene, the most marked development appears to be a growing conviction among South Vietnamese that the Viet Cong no longer are likely to emerge victorious in the military field.
 - A. In turn, this more favorable public attitude has helped Saigon's new military leaders to provide the country a greater degree of governmental stability.
 - 1. Unity among the military, however, is still fragile, and there is little indication that the various political factions in the country are abandoning their tradictional fence-sitting and developing genuine enthusiasm for the regime.
 - 2. Moreover, as the threat of military defeat recedes, there are signs of growing public concern over economic problems and over dislocations caused by the increased US presence.